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BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS: A SUMMARY FOR
THE NEW YORK LAWYER
GEORGE M. Zn*ERAX*
I. ITRODUcoN
IIQUY-Sell Agreements" concerning the stock of closely held corporations
have become increasingly popular in recent years and consequently of
increasing interest to both lawyers and the Internal Revenue Service. The
purpose of this article is to draw together into one place for the New York
lawyer the principal considerations as to taxes, New York law, and drafting
which enter into the problem-
Basically a buy-sell agreement provides for two things:
1. A stockholder may not sell his stock during his lifetime without first
offering it at an agreed price to the corporation and/or the other stockholders.
We shall see later that this "lifetime restriction" is an essential requirement in
order that the contract price be accepted as the value of the stock for estate
tax purposes. It also has the practical advantage of enabling the stockholders
to keep control in their own hands.
2. On the death of a stockholder, his shares will be purchased from his
estate at an agreed price by the corporation and/or the surviving stockholders.
Thus, the estate of a deceased stockholder receives cash for his stock.
This is a substantial benefit, since the stock of a closely held corporation is in
most cases of little or no value to the estate. The estate also receives tax
benefits: (a) The stock can be valued for estate tax purposes at the contract
price, thus avoiding the frequently difficult, and at best uncertain, problem
of valuing the stock of a closely held corporation; (b) although there is a
sale of the stock by the estate, there is normally neither gain nor loss for income
tax purposes, since the amount realized by the estate and the estate's basis
in the stock are identical, viz., the price fixed in the agreement. The foregoing
tax considerations, together with the hazards and qualifications to which they
are subject, are discussed below.
The surviving stockholders also benefit from the agreement, since they
acquire complete control of the corporation, free from interference by, or
accountability to, the estate of the deceased stockholder.
11. Tyxs oF Ao1.m~mzEME
There are numerous variations of buy-sell agreements, but they fall
into two general classes, depending upon whether the corporation or the other
stockholders are to purchase the stockz
(a) The "Redemption Contract" provides in substance that on the -death
of a stockholder the corporation will purchase his stock from his estate.
* Member of the New York State Bar; Lecturer, University of 'Buffalo School of Law.
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Similarly, if a stockholder desires to sell during his lifetime, he must first offer
the stock to the corporation.
(b) The "Cross-Purchase Contract" provides in substance that on the
death of a stockholder the other stockholders will purchase his stock from his
estate. Similarly, if a stockholder desires to sell during his lifetime, he must
first offer the stock to the other stockholders.
The redemption contract is usually preferred, because corporate funds
on which only the corporate income tax has been paid are used to make the
purchase. Where individual stockholders purchase under a cross-purchase
contract, they usually are obliged to use funds which were obtained from the
corporation in taxable form such as salary or dividends, and on which both
the corporation and the individual stockholders have paid income tax.' For
this reason the purchase under the cross-purchase contract is usually more
costly to the remaining stockholders, particularly in the case of lifetime pur-
chase where life insurance proceeds are not available to make payment. Never-
theless, there are situations in which the cross-purchase contract is preferable;
e.g., as discussed more fully below, in the case of certain family-owned corpo-
rations, a redemption contract can have serious income tax consequences which
can be avoided by use of a cross-purchase contract.
III. UsE oF LFE INSUANCE
A buy-out under either type of contract usually requires a substantial sum
of money, and insurance on the lives of the stockholders is frequently used
as a source of the funds with which to make the purchase on death. In the
case of a redemption contract, the corporation procures a policy on the life
of each stockholder; the corporation is the beneficiary, owns the policies, and
pays the premiums. On the death of a stockholder, the corporation collects the
proceeds and uses them to purchase the decedent's stock from his estate.
In the case of a cross-purchase contract, each stockholder owns, pays
the premiums on, and is the beneficiary under a policy on the life of each other
stockholder. 2 On the death of a stockholder, each surviving stockholder
3
collects the proceeds of his policy on the life of the decedent and the survivors
together purchase the decedent's stock from his estate.
It is obvious that the redemption contract lends itself more readily than
the cross-purchase contract to funding by life insurance. For the redemption
1. If the corporation has elected to be taxed as a partnership under Subchapter S
of the Internal Revenue Code (Sec. 1371 ft.) the income tax distinction between the two
contracts becomes unimportant because the corporation is not subject to federal income
tax (Internal Revenue Code Sec. 1372(b)(1)).
2. It might seem simpler for each stockholder to own and pay the premiums on a
policy on his own life, the policy being payable to the other stockholders; but then the
insurance proceeds (as well as the value of the stock) would be included in the decedent's
estate for estate tax purposes (Internal Revenue Code Sec. 2042).
3. A trustee is sometimes used to insure the proper application of the insurance pro-
ceeds.
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contract the corporation need purchase only as many policies as there are
stockholders. On the other hand, to fund a cross-purchase contract, each
stockholder must own a policy on the life of each other stockholder, so that
where there are more than two stockholders it will be necessary to procure
and keep track of a large number of policies; when a stockholder dies, his
policies on the lives of the survivors must be obtained from his estate; when
a new stockholder comes into the corporation, a large number of new policies
must be obtained.
For income tax purposes, under either type of contract, the insurance
proceeds are not taxable to the beneficiary,4 and the premiums paid are not
deductible even when paid by the corporation. 5 There formerly was danger
that insurance premiums paid by a torporation to fund a redemption contract
would be considered taxable dividends to the stockholders; however, the
decisions6 so holding have been reversed,7 and it is now clear that a redemption
contract may be funded with life insurance without fear that the premiums
paid by the corporation will be considered dividends to the stockholders."
The use of-life insurance raises the question of insurable interest. Does a
corporation have an insurable interest in the lives of its stockholders for
purposes of funding a redemption contract? Do stockholders have an insurable
interest in each other's lives for purposes of funding a cross-purchase contract?
The New York statute,9 which has not been construed as to these questions,
defines an insurable interest (between unrelated persons) as "a lawful and
substantial economic interest in having the life . . .of the person insured
continue, as distinguished from an interest which would arise only by, or
would be enhanced in value by, the death... of the person insured." It seems
clear that a corporation has an insurable interest in the life of an officer or an
active principal stockholder, and that a stockholder has an insurable interest
in the life of another active stockholder.10 The test of insurable interest is io
be applied at the time the insurance is obtained, so that the insurance remains
effective even after the retirement of an officer or active stockholder." There-
fore, there should be no problem in the case of the ordinary close corporation
where all stockholders are active in the business; however, there is doubt as
to whether either the corporation or the other stockholders have an insurable
interest in the life of a stockholder who is inactive at the time when the
insurance is procured.
4. Internal Revenue Code Sec. 101(a)(1).
5. Id. Sec. 264(a).
6. Sanders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942 (D.C. Utah 1957); Henry E. Prunier, 28 T.C. 19
(1957); see also Oreste Casale, 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
7. Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958); Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d
818 (1st Cir. 1957); Casale v. -Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
8. Rev. Rul. 59-184, I.R.E. 1959-21, 11.
9. N.Y. Insurance Law Sec. 146.
10. 2 Couch on Insurance 2d, Sec. 24:147, 24:149.
11. Id. Sec. 24:148.
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Before leaving the subject of life insurance, it should be pointed out that
its use primarily benefits the surviving stockholders rather than the decedent.
The stockholders themselves provide the premiums for the policies-directly
in the case of a cross-purchase contract, through the corporation in the case
of a redemption contract. Therefore, when a stockholder dies he has directly or
indirectly paid an amount equal to the premiums for the insurance on his life,
and thus has, in effect, provided the funds with which his interest is bought
out; his estate would be better off if the stockholder had put the same money
into a policy on his life payable to his estate-then on his death the estate
would have both the insurance proceeds and the stock. It follows that on the
death of a stockholder the surviving stockholders get something of a bargain by
reason of the insurance. This is not to say, of course, that the use of insurance
is inadvisable; at the time the agreement is entered into no one knows who
will die first, and who will reap the windfall described above. Moreover,
each stockholder desires to buy out the interest of a deceased associate and to
have the necessary funds available; in many cases life insurance is the only
practicable source of funds, particularly in the case of a cross-purchase contract
where after-tax dollars would otherwise have to be used in most cases, as we
have seen. In the case of a redemption contract, the corporation might be able
to build up a fund out of its profits, but it would then run the risk of the
heavy tax on unreasonably accumulated earnings.
12
IV. FEDERAL ESTATE TAx CONSEQUENCES OF PURCHASE ON DEATH
One of the purposes of -a buy-sell agreement is to have the stock of a
deceased stockholder valued for estate tax purposes at the purchase price fixed
by the agreement. Valuation of the stock of a closely held corporation for
estate tax purposes is a knotty problem.' 3 If the purchase price set forth in the
agreement is accepted as the value of the stock, this problem is avoided; if the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue decides that the estate tax value of the
stock is greater than the contract price, the estate obviously suffers because
it14 then must pay estate tax on the excess value which it never receives. The
Commissioner and the courts do not seem to be in entire accord as to when
the contract price is acceptable.
The Commissioner's position is as follows: whether or not the contract
price will be accepted as the value of the stock for estate tax purposes "depends
upon the circumstances of the particular case"; the following specific tests
are then given in negative terms: (1) "Little weight will be accorded a price
contained in a . .. contract under which the decedent is free to dispose of
12. Internal Revenue Code Sec. 531 ff.; see Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner,
251 F.2d 278 (7th 6r. 1958); Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24
TCM 1959, 59.
13. The standards of valuation to be applied are discussed in Regs. Sec. 20.2031-2(f)
and Rev. Rul. 59-60, IRB 1959-9, 8.
14. Or perhaps the purchasing stockholder or corporation; see In re Galewitz Estate.
infra, note 65.
BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
the underlying securities at any price he chooses during his lifetime"; and
(2) "Even if the decedent is not free to dispose of the underlying securities
at other than the... contract price, such price will be disregarded in determin-
ing the value of the securities unless it is determined under the circumstances
of the particular case that the agreement represents a bona fide business ar-
rangement and not a device to pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects
of his bounty for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth."' 5 Moreover, "special attention should be given to determining
an adequate value of the good will of the business in all cases in which the
decedent has not agreed, for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, that his interest passes at his death to, for example, his
surviving partner or partners."'16
Translated into more positive terms, this seems to mean that the contract
price will be accepted as the estate tax value of the stock if: (1) the stock-
holder is restricted during his lifetime from selling his stock at other than the
contract price; (2) the contract does represent a bona fide business arrange-
ment; and (3) the agreement is not a device to pass the stockholder's shares
to the natural objects of his bounty for less than adequate consideration. 17
There should be no difficulty in meeting these requirements where the stock-
holders are not related. The real difficulty arises in the case of a family
corporation: suppose that the stockholders are a father and his two sons;
if the father dies and the contract price is less than the actual value of the
stock determined by the Commissioner, the latter would be expected to
challenge the contract price as a device to pass the stock from the father to
his sons without paying the full estate tax on it. However, the Commissioner
has met with little success in such situations.
Let us first mention two cases which, while they involve partnerships
and not corporations, establish principles which were relied upon in the
corporate case which we shall consider in a moment. Broderick v. Gore'8 dealt
with a partnership composed of a father and his two sons; their agreement
contained a lifetime restriction on sale, and provided that on the death of a
partner his interest would be bought out at its book value. The father died,
naming his sons as his executors and residuary legatees; the sons proceeded,
as executors to sell to themselves as partners, the interest of their father at
its book value, $345,000; the Commissioner contended that for estate tax
purposes the father's interest should be valued 't its fair market value, about
$516,000. The court upheld the contract price as the estate tax value, even
though the fair market value of the father's interest "may have been more than
15. Reg. Sec. 20.2031-2(h); see also Rev. Rul. 59-60, IR 1959-9, 8 Sec. s.
16. Regs. Sec. 20.2031-3.
17. The proposed regulations (Prop. Reg. Sec. 20.2031-2(h)) provided in substance
that the contract price was presumed to be acceptable if there was a lifetime restriction
and the agreement was the "result of arm's length bargaining between strangers." This
presumption is not contained in the final regulations.
18. 224 Fed. 2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955).
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its book value. But such interest was burdened and encumbered with a
certain restriction contained in the partnership agreement. If the decedent had
concluded during his lifetime to withdraw from the partnership, he would
not have been free to sell his interest in the open market or to a willing buyer
at its fair market value.... And inasmuch as the estate was thus bound and
obligated, such interest had no value to the estate in excess of its book value.
In other words, the interest of the estate in the property was by the contract
limited in respect to value, the limitation being the book value thereof at the
time of the death of the decedent. And where the interest of an estate in
property is burdened or encumbered in that respect by such an effective con-
tractual provision, the estate tax should be based upon the book value rather
than a fair market value in excess of the book value.....
"... The agreement was by its clear terms enforceable in favor of and
against the estate of the first copartner to die and the two surviving
copartners, whether the first to die was the decedent or one of the
sons. It was specifically enforceable regardless of which copartner
should die first. It was not known whether the decedent would outlive
one or both of the sons. And it was supported by an adequate and
full consideration...."
Thus in Broderick v. Gore a decedent was permitted to pass his interest
in the business to the "natural objects of his bounty" at an estate tax value
considerably less than its alleged actual value. A similar result had been
reached a year earlier in Estate of Lionel Weil.19
The corporate situation was presented in Estate of Orville B. Littick.
20
There the decedent and his two brothers were the sole stockholders. Less than
a year before the decedent died, and while he was suffering from an incurable
cancer, he and his brothers entered into a redemption contract which contained
a lifetime restriction and provided for purchase of a deceased stockholder's
interest for $200,000. The actual value of the decedent's stock was stipulated
to be almost $258,000. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer, following
Broderick and Weil, supra. The Court pointed out that the lifetime restriction
-was present. While it was stipulated that the fair market value of the stock
exceeded the contract price of $200,000, "there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the $200,000 figure was not fairly arrived at by arm's-length
negotiation or that any tax avoidance scheme was involved." Although the
decedent was mortally ill when he entered into the agreement, "it certainly
was possible that one or the other of his brothers could still have predeceased
him." The court then stated the rule as follows: "Where for the purpose of
keeping control of a business in its present management, the owners set up in
an arm's-length agreement, which we consider this to be, the price at which the
interest of a past owner is to be disposed of by his estate to the other owners,
19. 22 T.C. 1270 (1954) (Acq.).
20. 31 T.C. 181 (1958).
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that price controls for estate tax purposes, regardless of the market value of
the interest to be disposed of." (Emphasis added.)
Two 1960 decisions involving partnerships follow the same line. In
Angela Fiorito2l the partnership consisted of the decedent, his wife and their
two sons; on the death of decedent the sons purchased the decedent's interest for
a book value of $182,782.25 as against a stipulated fair market value more
than $113,000.00 higher; nevertheless the Tax Court upheld the contract
price as the estate tax value of the decedent's interest, despite the fact that the
partnership agreement was vague as to whether the decedent could have sold
during his lifetime. In Davis v. United States 2 a father and son were equal
partners under a partnership agreement allowing the survivor to purchase the
interest of the decedent for one-half of its book value; this value was upheld,
apparently on the ground that the agreement was entered into "for legitimate
business reasons," viz., that under the circumstances it would be impossible for
one partner to raise the funds to buy out the interest of the other at full value.
The Commissioner has acquiesced in both the Littick
23 and Fiorito24
decisions; it may be doubted whether Littick can be squared with the Com-
missioner's regulations and ruling,25 at any rate, they must be read in the light
of these cases.
It seems safe to conclude from the foregoing that the estate tax value
of the decedent's stock will be measured by the contract price even in the case
of a family-owned corporation, when the following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) the stockholder is restricted during his lifetime from selling his stock with-
out offering it to the corporation or the other stockholders at the contract
price; (2) all of the stockholders are bound by the agreement, in order to
provide the mutuality of obligation which seemed important in Broderick and
Littick; and (3) there is no evidence of a purpose to avoid estate tax in fixing
the price.
Mention should be made of the estate tax consequences of the use of life
insurance to fund the contract. In the case of a cross-purchase contract, the
proceeds of the policy on the decedent's life, which is held by the other stock-
holders, are not included in the decedent's taxable estate,2 6 because the decedent
possessed no incidents of ownership in that policy;2 7 however, under the
agreement, the decedent will have owned the policies on the lives of the other
stockholders, and the value of these unmatured policies is includible in his
taxable estate.28 In the case of a redemption contract, the corporation owns a
policy on each of the stockholders-if the purchase price is based on book
21. 33 T.C. 440 (1960).
22. - Fed. Supp. -, 60-1 USTC (CCH) Sec. 11, 943 (D.C. Utah 1960).
23. I.R.B. 1959-32, 6 (August 10, 1959).
24. I.R.B. 1960-20, 7 (May 9, 1960).
25. Supra note 15.
26. Rev. Rul. 56-397, I.R.B. 56-34; 14, C.B. 1956-2, 599.
27. Internal Revenue Code Sec. 2042(2).
28. Rev. Rul. 56-397, supra note 26.
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value, the unmatured value of all of the policies must, of course, be-taken into
account in the computation of the book value, since the policies are assets of
the corporation2 9
V. FEDERAL INComE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF PURCHASE ON -DEATH
At first sight, it would seem that there should be no income tax con-
sequences of a purchase on death, whether under a redemption contract or
under a cross-purchase contract: assuming that the contract price is accepted
as the estate tax value of the stock, the stock is valued in the decedent's
return at that price; thus the contract price becomes the estate's basis for
gain or loss; 30 when the estate sells the stock for the contract price, the basis
and amount realized are equal, so that there is neither gain nor loss.
In the case of a cross-purchase contract, this result is achieved without
difficulty, but in the case of a redemption contract there can be complications.
The purchase by a corporation of its own stock in accordance with a
redemption contract is a "redemption" within the meaining of the Internal
Revenue Code; 31 therefore, the payment by the corporation is treated as a
dividend32 unless one of the four tests33 set forth in Sec. 302(b) is met. The
problem, then, is to bring the redemption within one of those tests. Usually
the "complete redemption" test of Sec. 302(b)(3) is met by a redemption
contract, since the corporation redeems all of the stock owned by the stock-
holder. This test is always met by a redemption contract if the stockholders
have no relationship to one other, but problems arise if they are related.
Under Sec. 318 of the Code a stockholder is deemed, under certain
circumstances, to own the stock owned by certain members of his family, and
by certain partnerships, corporations, estates and trusts in which he has an
interest. These provisions are made applicable to redemptions under Sec. 302
by Sec. 302(c); accordingly, to the extent that the attribution rules of Sec.
318 apply to the redemption under Sec. 302, the stockholder is deemed to
own, not only the stock which he actually owns, but also the stock owned by
these related parties. Therefore, even if the stockholder sells all of his stock
to the corporation, he may still be deqmed to "own" other stock held by a
related party, so that the corporation will not have redeemed all of his stock
29. In his proposed regulations (Prop. Reg. Sec. 20.2041-1(c)(6)) the Commissioner
took the position that the insurance proceeds paid to the corporation on the death of a
stockholder should be taken into account (1) in determining whether the contract price
is acceptable as estate tax value, and (2) if it was determined that the price is not ac-
ceptable, the proceeds would be taken into account in valuing the stock. This provision
does not appear in the final regulations; in any case, it is doubtful whether it would be
accepted by the courts which decided Littick and the partnership cases discussed above.
30. Internal Revenue Code Sec. 1014, Regs. Sec. 1.1014-1(a).
31. Sec. 317(b).
32. Id. Sec. 302(d).
33. The tests are: (1) Redemption not essentially equivalent to a dividend; (2) sub-
stantially disproportionate redemption; (3) complete redemption terminating the stock-
holder's interest; and (4) redemption in certain- railroad reorganizations.
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within the meaning of the "complete redemption" test of Sec. 302(b)(3), and
the redemption will be treated as a taxable dividend to the stockholder.
In a complete redemption the attribution rules are waived to a limited
extent: the provisions of Sec. 318(a) (1), by which an individual is deemed to
own the stock held by his spouse, children, grandchildren and parents, are
waived in the case of a complete redemption if certain conditions are met.
3 4
However, only the "family rule" is waived-the attribution rules concerning
partnerships, corporations, estates and trusts contained in Sec. 318(a)(2)35
remain in effect. From these general principles the following conclusions can
be drawn:
1. If all of the stock of the corporation is owned by individuals (even if
they are all related within the family rule), and if the selling stockholder 36
has no interest in any partnership, corporation, estate or trust in which another
stockholder 3 6 is interested, then the family rule alone can be applicable and
the selling stockholder may sell all of his stock to the corporation during his
lifetime without difficulty, since the family rule is waived.
2. However, if a partnership, corporation, estate or trust in which the
selling stockholder 36 has an interest, holds stock in the corporation, or if the
selling stockholder 36 is interested in a partnership, corporation, estate or trust
in which another stockholder36 is also interested, 37 the other attribution rules
can 38 come into play and prevent the redemption from being complete within
the meaning of Sec. 302, whether the sale is made during lifetime or on death.
3. On the death of a stockholder the selling stockholder is his estate,
so that all of the attribution rules concerning estates must be taken into account.
For our purposes the last of the foregoing conclusions is the most important,
because it deals with the situation arising when a corporation purchases the
interest of a deceased stockholder on his death. This is the most frequent
culmination of a redemption contract and it is essential to bear in mind that
the waiver of the family rule does not apply here. If John Jones and his
two sons own all of the stock of the corporation, John may sell all of his
stock to the corporation during his lifetime and the redemption will be complete
because the waiver of the family rule prevents the stock of the sons from
being attributed to him; but, if John dies, and the stock is redeemed from his
estate, the estate may be charged with ownership of the stock of the sons
and the redemption will not be "complete". Therefore, it is important to under-
stand the extent of the attribution rule for estates, and we will proceed to
discuss it in some detail.
34. Internal Revenue Code Sec. 302(c) (2).
35. And the option rule of Sec. 318(a)(3).
36. Or a "member of his family" within the meaning of Sec. 318(a)(1); Cf. the
discussion of Rev. Rul. 59-233 infra.
37. See Regs. Sec. 1.318-1(a) Example 3.
38. Depending upon the specific provisions of Sec. 318(a)(2) for partnerships, cor-
porations, estates and trusts.
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In general, an estate is deemed to own, not only the stock which it
actually owns, but also the stock "owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a...
beneficiary." 39 Thus, in our example, above, if John Jones' two sons are
beneficiaries of his estate, the estate is deemed to own all of the stock of the
corporation.
What stock does an estate own actually? It actually owns all stock
"subject to administration by the executor or administrator for the purpose
of paying claims against the estate and expenses of administration notwith-
standing that, under local law, legal title to such property vests in the
decedent's heirs, legatees or devisees immediately upon death.140 Therefore,
an estate does not actually own stock not subject to the payment of claims,
even though it may be includible in the estate tax return as a gift made in
contemplation of death4 ' or as property held in joint tenancy.42 On the other
hand, the estate does actually own stock of the decedent, even though under
local law title vests in the beneficiaries of the estate, as long as the stock is
subject to administration for the purpose of paying claims and expenses.
What stock does an estate own by attribution? An estate is deemed to
own the stock of its "beneficiaries". The regulations43 under Sec. 318 have
interpreted this term as follows:
1. A beneficiary is "any person entitled to receive property of a decedent
pursuant to a will or pursuant to laws of descent and distribution." 43 There-
fore, one who takes only assets passing outside the estate, such as the direct
beneficiary of life insurance proceeds, or a joint tenant with the decedent, is
not a "beneficiary".
2. A person is not a "beneficiary" unless he has a "direct present interest"
in the estate-therefore, a remainderman is not a "beneficiary". 44
3. A person ceases to be a "beneficiary" when he has been paid his share
in full and there is only a remote possibility that he will have to refund any of
his share as a contribution to estate liabilities. 45 However, the Commissioner
has ruled that a residuary beneficiary does not cease to be a "beneficiary"
until the estate has been closed, even though he has received his full share.40
Therefore, purchase by the corporation under a redemption contract is
endangered if any other stockholder is a "beneficiary" of the deceased stock-
holder's estate. The Commissioner has attempted to broaden the danger area
still further: the three conclusions concerning attribution arrived at above were
punctuated with the qualification "or member of his family"; these were
39. Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 318(a) (2) (A).
40. Regs. 1.318-3(a).
41. Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 2035.
42. Id. Sec. 2040.
43. Regs. Sec. 1.318-3(a).
44. Ibid., Examples 1 and 2.
45. Regs. Sec. 1.318-3(a).
46. Rev. Rul. 60-18, I.R.B. 1960-3, 14.
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necessitated by Rev. Rul. 59-233.47 This ruling concerned a situation in which
all of the stock of a corporation was owned by a widower and by a trust created
by the will of his late wife for the benefit of their children. The trust wished to
sell its shares to the corporation in a complete redemption; the Commissioner
held that the sale would not be a complete redemption under Sec. 302(b) (3)
because the shares of the widower were attributable to the trust. The reason
for this was not that the widower was a beneficiary of the trust and that his
shares would be attributed to the trust under Sec. 318(a) (2)(B)-this rule
could not apply because the widower was not in fact a beneficiary of the
trust. Rather, the Commissioner's reasoning proceeded as follows: the trust
is deemed to own the shares of the children ;48 now the children own no shares
actually, but they are deemed to own the shares of their father (the widower)
by reason of the family rule; 49 since the children are deemed to win the shares
of their father, and the trust is deemed to own the shares of the chil-
dren, the trust is deemed to own the shares of the father, and thus is
cousidered as owning all of the stock of the corporation; Therefore, a
redemption of the shares owned directly by the trust would not be a
"complete redemption" under Sec. 302(b)(3). This reasoning seems to fly in
the face of Sec. 302 (c) (2) which states that the family rule "shall not apply"
in the case of a complete redemption-therefore, it should not be used to
attribute the father's shares to the trust through his children. The Commis-
sioner's answer is that the legislative history of Sec. 302(c)(2) "makes it
clear" that the family rule is to be waived in a complete redemption only
where it would attribute shares to the selling stockholder; it is not waived
where, as in this case, it would attribute shares to others (viz. the children)
than the selling stockholder, and through those others, to the selling stock-
holder.
It may be doubted whether Rev. Rul. 59-233 is correct and whether
it will survive challenge; 50 nevertheless, it must be taken into account in
preparing buy-sell agreements as long as it stands. Its most serious danger
is that it would apply if an estate were *substituted for the trust in the fact
situation; suppose that a father and son own all the stock; the father dies
and leaves his entire estate to his wife. Under the' statute and regulations we
would conclude that the stock may safely be redeemed from the estate,
because the son's shares are not attributable to.it; he is not a beneficiary
of the estate, so that Sec. 318(a) (2) (A) does not apply; his shares should
not be attributed to the estate through his mother because the family rule
is waived. However, under the theory of Rev. Rul. 59-233 the son's shares
47. I.RXB. 1959-28, 9.
48. Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 318(a)(2)(B).
49. Id. Sec. 318(a) (1) (A) (ii).
50. See the sharp criticism by Gleason and Jones in 12 Journal of Taxation.268 (May,
1960), where the ruling is attacked as being contrary to the Internal Revenue Code, its
legislative history, and the regulations.
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would be attributed to his mother and, through her, to the estate so that
the redemption would not be complete.
We can see from the foregoing that a redemption contract can be
dangerous where the stock is held by members of a single family, or where
the stockholders (or members of their families) are interested in the same
partnership, corporation, estate or trust. It may be possible to rely on
other sections of the Code to prevent the redemption on death from being
a taxable dividend; perhaps it can be shown that as a matter of fact "the
redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend"; 5 1 or it may be
that the redemption from the estate will be "substantially disproportionate
with respect to "the estate within the meaning of Sec. 302(b)(2)-although
here all of the attribution rules would apply,52 including the broad "chain
reaction" attribution permitted by Sec. 318(a)(4)(A) ;53 or it may be that
a dividend can be avoided, to the extent of the amount of estate taxes and
funeral and administration expenses, under Sec. 303. Nevertheless, in many
cases of family corporations, it will be found impracticable to use a redemp-
tion contract. The only solution in such cases is to use a cross-purchase
contract, despite its disadvantages.
A few miscellaneous income tax consequences of purchase on death
remain to be mentioned. In the -case of a redemption contract, there is
no change in the basis of the stock of the surviving stockholders, because
they pay nothing for the decedent's stock-the corporation makes the
payment; on the other hand, in a cross-purchase contract the surviving
stockholders buy the decedent's stock, and their basis in that stock is the
amount they paid pursuant to the cross-purchase contract.5 4 Formerly
there was danger that a buy-out of one stockholder by the corporation
would be considered a dividend to the surviving stockholders;5 5 that danger
is now past,56 and it is clear that "a redemption by the corporation of the
decedent shareholder's shares of the corporation's stock from his estate does
not constitute a constructive dividend to the remaining shareholder."5 7
VI. VA.IDITY AND EFFECT OF TEE CONTRACT UNDER NEW YoRK LAW
In general, it may be said that buy-sell agreements can be validly
drawn under New York law. Redemption contracts have been held to be
valid and specifically enforceable, 58 against attack chiefly on the ground
51. Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 302(b)(1).
52. Id. Sec. 302(c).
53. Slightly moderated by Regs. Sec. 1318-1(b).
54. Id. Sec. 1012.
55. Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957).
56. Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 Fed. 2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1958) reversing Joseph R.
Holsey, supra note 55; acq. Rev. Rul. 58-614, C.B., 1958-2, 920.
57. Rev. Rul. 59-286, I.R.B. 1959-36, 9.
58. Greater New York Carpet House, Inc. v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Ist Dep't 1940); Murphy v. George Murphy, Inc., 7 Misc. 2d 647, 166
N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. Co. 1957); Ionic Shop, Inc. v. Rathfeld, - Misc. -, 64 N.Y.S.2d 101
(N.Y. Co. 1946).
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that they were lacking in consideration furnished by the corporation under
the theory of Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz. 9 There a corpo-
ration and one of its employees (who was also a stockholder) agreed that
on termination of his employment the employee would sell his "stock back
to the corporation; after termination of the employment the corporation
unsuccessfully attempted to enforce the agreement. The Court of Appeals
said that under this agreement the corporation's only promise was to buy
the stock-it gave no other consideration for the employee's promise to
sell; now, a corporation may purchase its own stock only out of surplus, 60
and since there was no way of knowing at the time when the contract was
executed whether the corporation would have sufficient surplus when the
time came for it to purchase the stock, it would be impossible for the
corporation to perform under certain conditions. The Court concluded:
"It is as if the (corporation) had a choice to buy or not to buy as it
pleased. . . .Under these circumstances, we have a contract not mutually
binding, and therefore lacking in consideration." The court pointed out
that its decision was based on the fact that the corporation's promise to
purchase its stock was its only promise; if the corporation had furnished
other consideration, then the contract "would be good unless it appeared
that the stock would be purchased out -of capital. This would be a matter
of defense."
Therefore, a redemption contract is not lacking in consideration as
long as the corporation is to do something in addition to purchasing its
own stock; in the redemption contract cases the courts have in fact distin-
guished Topken by finding additional consideration, such- as cancellation of
a prior contract,61 or the corporation's agreement to pay life insurance
premiums on the policies used to fund the contract, 62 even if this agreement
is only implied.63
The cross-purchase type of contract has been upheld against attack on
the grounds that it was an attempted testamentary disposition, that the
contract price was less than the actual value of the stock, and that the
contract was an attempt to destroy the right of election of the stockholder's
widow; 4 it has also been held specifically enforceable. 65 The contract in
the Galewitz case6 6 did not contain a restriction on lifetime transfer by a
stockholder: we have seen6 7 that such a restriction is desirable (and, indeed,
59. 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928).
60. N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 664(5).
61. Murphy v. George Murphy, Inc., supra note 58.
62. Greater New York Carpet House, Inc. v. Herschmann, supra note 58.
63. Ionic Shop, Inc. v. Rathfeld, supra note 58.
64. In re Galewitz Estate, 206 Misc. 218, 132 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Surr. Ct. 1954), affirmed
without opinion, 285 App. Div. 947, 139 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Ist Dep't 1955).
65. In re Galewitz Estate, 2 App. Div. 2d 280, 160 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1st Dep't 1957),
affirmed without opinion, 5 N.Y.2d 721, 177 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1958).
66. Supra notes 63 and 64.
67. Supra, Part IV.
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essential) in order that the contract price be acceptable as estate tax value
on death; the court held the contract valid and enforceable under New York
law despite the absence of this restriction, stating, however: "it does not
appear to be seriously questioned that had the contract contained restrictions
against the disposition of his stock by either party during his lifetime, it
would be enforceable."68 This language points out another advantage of the
lifetime restriction: It strengthens the validity of the contract under New York
law.
The absence of a lifetime restriction caused further difficulty when
Galewitz came to the Appellate Division for a second time,69 after a trial of
the issues. For federal estate tax purposes, the decedent's shares had been
valued at more than double the contract price-in large measure, no doubt,
because of the absence of the lifetime restriction. There being no provision
in the will for the apportionment of estate taxes, the Appellate Division held
that the estate tax deficiency, 0 representing the difference in value between
the contract price and the estate tax value, had been properly apportioned to
and was payable by the purchasing stockholder in accordance with Sec. 124
of the New York Decedent Estate Law.
Problems can arise when the buy-sell agreement is too closely related to
the will of the deceased stockholder. In Mofsky v. Goldnzan1 l the agreement
did not contain the usual provision that the estate of the deceased stockholder
would sell; rather, it provided that the deceased stockholder would make a will
bequeathing his shares to the plaintiff. On motion to strike certain defenses
to the plaintiff's action to enforce the agreement, the Appellate Division upheld
as sufficient defenses alleging in substance (1) that the plaintiff had an adequate
remedy at law, and (2) that performance of the agreement would thwart the
widow's right of election.
In In re Bracalello's Will,72 the stockholder made a will bequeathing any
stock in three corporations "which I have a right to convey" to appellants;
less than a week later he entered into a redemption contract with the three
corporations. On his death the question arose whether the stock was to be
delivered to the legatees under the will, or sold to the corporations under the
contract; the Appellate Division reversed the Surrogate's determination that
the contract governed and remitted the matter to the Surrogate to take proof
as to the intention of the testator in bequeathing the stock.73 Therefore,
while it is harmless, and perhaps helpful, to include in a stockholder's will
a provision directing his executor to carry out the buy-sell agreement, it is
just as well not to refer to the stock in any other way.
68. Supra note 63.
69. Supra note 64.
70. Some $400,000 in this case.
71. 3 App. Div. 2d 311, 160 N.Y.S.2d 581 (4th Dep't 1957).
72. 7 App. Div. 2d 1022, 184 N.Y.S.2d 459 (2nd Dep't 1959).
73. The Surrogate took proof and once again reached the conclusion that the redemp-
tion contract governed - Misc. -, 196 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
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VII. BASIC PROVISIONS oF THE CONTRACT
A brief summary of the basic provisions of the buy-sell agreement may
serve to sum up the conclusions reached above and show how they can be
applied in practice. The discussion is not intended to be complete, nor the
provisions outlined unalterable: numerous variations can be used to carry out
the basic purposes of the agreement, and additional provisions can be added
to cover special situations. The purpose here is simply to mention the general
classes of provisions which should appear in every buy-sell agreement.
a. Parties: All stockholders should be parties to the agreement. If less
than all are parties, the lack of complete mutuality of obligation to sell may
imperil the use of the contract price as estate tax value.
b. Recitals: The recitals should include a statement that it is con-
sidered to be in the best interest of the stockholders and of the corporation
that the latter's stock continue to be held by those active in its management.
This is usually the case, and shows that the agreement has a business purpose,
which is valuable for estate tax valuation purposes.
74
c. Lifetime Restriction: The agreement should 'provide that no stock-
holder may sell his stock during his lifetime without first offering it at an agreed
price to the corporation or the other stockholders (depending upon which type
of agreement is used). We have seen the importance of this provision for the
purpose of both estate tax valuation and validity under New York law.
d. Purchase on Death: Ordinarily the most important part of the agree-
ment to the parties is the provision that on the death of a stockholder his
shares will be purchased, either by the corporation or by the surviving stock-
holders (depending upon the type of agreement). Occasionally a stockholder
will wish to reserve the right to give away his shares during his life, or to
bequeath them on death, to a specified person or persons; this is usually
because the stockholder has a son or other close relative who may some day
wish to be active in the business. This motive is obviously important to the
stockholder, but the parties should understand that such a provision, even
though narrowly restricted, does mean that the stockholder in question can
dispose of his shares free of the agreement, and thus runs the risk of having them
valued in his estate at a value in excess of the contract price.
e. Price: Usually the same price is fixed for both lifetime sale and sale on
death. Sometimes the parties will wish to fix a lower price for sale during
lifetime, either as an incentive to stockholders to retain their stock or because
the unavailability of life insurance proceeds makes the price payable on death
impracticable. At any rate the lifetime price should not exceed the price on
death.
The methods of fixing price are numerous: book value may be used, with
74. See Estate of Orville B. Littick, supra note 20.
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or without adjustments to reflect actual value of assets; or the parties may
fix a dollar value and agree to revise it annually by mutual consent (usually
with a provision for adjustment of the agreed value by percentage of later
increase or decrease of book value if the last agreed value is over a year old);
or average earnings for a period may be capitalized at an agreed percentage;
or the price may be fixed by appraisers. Sometimes combinations of the above
are used. The method used will depend to a large extent on the size and nature
of the business. At all events, the parties should bear in mind that the price
cuts both ways and should attempt to fix it as fairly as possible.
f. Terms of Payment: It is frequently impossible to pay the entire
purchase price in a lump sum, particularly in the case of lifetime purchase;
therefore, the agreement may contain provisions for payment in installments,
the obligation usually being evidenced by promissory notes and sometimes
secured by a pledge of the stock purchased.
g. Insurance: There no longer seems to be any danger in mentioning
insurance in the agreement,7 5 so that the agreement can describe the policies
and provide for payment of the premiums. We have seen that a provision in a
redemption contract for payment of premiums by the corporation strengthens
the validity of the contract under New York law.
h. Corporate Surplus: We have seen that a redemption contract can run
into difficulties under New York law if the corporation's only promise is to
purchase its own stock. This obstacle can be overcome by providing that if the
corporation shall not have sufficient surplus to enable it to make any payment
under the contract, the entire available surplus shall be used to make part
payment, and the corporation and its stockholders shall take measures to
create surplus, e.g., by reduction of capital or re-appraisal of assets; more-
over, the provision can be made that in any event payment is merely postponed
and that during the postponement there shall be no dividends or increase in
executive salaries.
A provision like the above usually will provide the machinery to handle
a surplus problem if it arises, and furnishes the additional consideration on
the part of the corporation (agreement to create surplus, not to pay dividends
or increase salaries, plus agreement to pay premiums when insurance is used)
which the New York courts require.
i. Miscellaneous Provisions: It is usually well to provide that the agree-
ment covers any additional shares in the corporation which the stockholders
may acquire; that their stock certificates shall bear notice that transfer is
subject to the agreement; and that the agreement is specifically enforceable. A
redemption contract should, of course, be approved by a resolution of the
directors, since the corporation is a party to it.
75. Rev. Rul. 59-184, supra note 7.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
A number of factors must be taken into account in the preparation of
buy-sell agreements. Most of the law on the subject is of very recent date, and
not all of it is well settled; therefore, it is advisable to check new developments
before preparing an agreement, and also to review existing agreements peri-
odically.
